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One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward:
An Elastic Products Liability Framework
for E-Cigarette Regulation
EVAN ROBINSON*
Societal innovation is frequently triggered by need. Year
after year, novel technologies are created by entrepreneurs
who seek to find a more effective, efficient, or less dangerous
way of accomplishing a specific goal. Oftentimes, these new
technologies enter the marketplace bringing with them a
host of uncertainties concerning both their performance and
effect on consumer activity. Despite these inevitable uncertainties, new technologies play a vital role in advancing society when appropriately controlled. Indeed, while the appropriate levels of control may vary across industries and
technologies, one principal remains constant amongst them
all: the obligation to balance risk with reward.
The need for such a delicate balancing act is no more
evident than in the case of e-cigarettes and vaporizer products. Over the last two decades, innovators and entrepreneurs alike have sought to develop healthier solutions aimed
at reducing the overwhelming number of fatalities and lifethreatening illnesses associated with one of America’s most
prevalent killers, the consumption of traditional tobacco cigarettes. While the undeniable benefits of these innovations
have been formally acknowledged by both the FDA and Congress, the current federal regulatory framework that
*
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without the extensive preparation efforts of the University of Miami Law Review.
Further, I would like to thank Professor Gudridge for his consistent support and
guidance throughout the writing process.
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controls their availability to consumers operates as a hindrance to innovation and industry growth rather than an effective means of protecting the public’s health.
This Note sets out to analyze the turbulent rise and fall
of government and consumer sentiment surrounding these
products and evaluates the effectiveness of the current FDA
regulatory framework, which functions to constrain the diffusion of what may be one of the next substantial public
health benefits. Specifically, this Note explores the potential
for a more effective and elastic regulatory framework which
incorporates the dual use of federal and state regulatory
measures to strike an optimal middle ground position between minimizing uncertain public health risks while simultaneously not discouraging innovation and industry growth.
In the final analysis, officials tasked with developing sufficient regulatory measures should seek to take calculated
risks in the interests of promoting innovation. After all, it
should come as no surprise that the most promising technological tobacco alternative emerged from an unregulated
environment.
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INTRODUCTION
The “leading cause of preventable death” in the United States is
attributable to the consumption of traditional tobacco cigarettes.1
Shockingly, nearly 500,000 people in the United States die each year
as a result of cigarette-related illnesses.2 “This is about one in five
deaths annually, or 1,300 deaths every day.”3 That said, after making
strides to reduce cigarette consumption, and thus minimizing their
associated medical ramifications, society is once again faced with
the task of combating yet another slew of tobacco-related illnesses.4
Although this task, a true 21st-century problem, arises in the technological age and concerns uncertain health risks associated with the
use of e-cigarettes and vaporizers. E-cigarettes and vaporizer devices, also known as “electronic nicotine delivery systems”
(“ENDS”), were developed with the primary intention of providing
a more safe and effective way of assisting traditional cigarette smokers in their efforts to kick a deadly habit.5 What was once thought to
be an innovative technological advancement aimed at improving societal health, however, has begun to rear its ugly head as a potential
Loch Ness monster of sorts imposing, in some cases, fatal consequences for its users.6 As the volume of injuries increases day by
day, researchers, scientists, and even the United States government
remain unsure as to the precise cause of these recent fatalities and
serious lung injuries affecting users of e-cigarette and vaporizer devices.7
1

Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CDC (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Cigarette Smoking Among U.S. Adults Lowest Ever Recorded: 14% in
2017, CDC (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2018/p1108-cigarette-smoking-adults.html.
5
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH
AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CDC 1, 8, 10, 201
(2016),
https://e-cigarettes.surgeongeneral.gov/documents/2016_SGR_Full_
Report_non-508.pdf.
6
See Hannah Knowles & Lena H. Sun, What We Know About the Mysterious
Vaping-Linked Illnesses and Deaths, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:11 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/09/07/what-we-know-about-mysterious-vaping-linked-illnesses-deaths/.
7
See id.
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Sudden and serious medical illnesses arising in various users of
e-cigarette and vaporizer products has motivated the federal government to respond through the enforcement of regulatory measures
created to prevent individuals from exposure to potentially dangerous tobacco-related products.8 The federal government’s regulatory
response, however, enforced in the wake of serious but uncertain
dangers, is likely to impose significant impediments to the innovation of healthier alternative tobacco products created for the primary
purpose of deterring individuals from smoking lethal cigarettes.9 As
a result, this problem presents interesting questions concerning the
federal government’s regulatory approach in protecting the public
health of its citizens from products that may possess uncertain dangers in addition to potentially significant public health benefits.10
Accordingly, this Note will investigate these issues and, in doing so,
seek to analyze a flexible regulatory framework most effective for
dealing with these types of products.
This Note first begins in Part I by examining the historical rise
of vaporizer and e-cigarette devices. Part I then summarizes the
main arguments and rationales of public health officials who support
a softer approach to the regulation of these devices, in addition to
those who favor a strict approach to regulation. With these regulatory rationales in hand, Part II explains the recent news surrounding
the nationwide outbreaks of vaping-related injuries. It further provides statistical data concerning the outbreaks, in addition to the
conclusions drawn by the CDC as to the primary cause of those outbreaks. Next, Part III reviews the historical progression of United
States tobacco regulation, focusing on FDA regulatory measures designed to regulate traditional cigarettes. Part III then goes on to analyze the significant impediments to the growth and longevity of the
e-cigarette and vaporizer industries as a result of the FDA’s promulgation of the Deeming Rule, which seeks to regulate these devices
under the same framework currently utilized for traditional tobacco
8

See id.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Why FDA Regulations Limiting E-Cigarette Marketing May Cost Lives and Violate the Constitution, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017
at
8:06
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/12/12/why-fda-regulations-limiting-e-cigarette-marketing-maycost-lives-and-violate-the-constitution/.
10
See id.
9
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cigarettes. After analyzing the challenges underlying the current
FDA regulatory regime, Part IV begins by explaining the need for a
more flexible regulatory approach that is capable of building in adjustment as the facts change. Specifically, Part IV proposes the implementation of certain federal regulatory measures to be coupled
with the use of state tort law as a means of providing an elastic regulatory framework best suited to manage products that may possess
uncertain dangers but which may also have significant public health
benefits.
I.

THE RISE OF VAPORIZER AND E-CIGARETTE TECHNOLOGY
As the demand for solutions to reduce the consumption of traditional cigarettes increased, Herbert Gilbert was successful in acquiring a patent for the first “smokeless nontobacco cigarette” in 1965.11
By 2004, the device gained significant popularity among Chinese
smokers “as a potential cessation device or an alternative cigarette
product” and was later introduced into the U.S. market by the mid2000s.12 Today, e-cigarettes are electronically powered devices,
which “operate by heating a liquid solution to a high enough temperature so that it produces an aerosol [vapor] that is inhaled.”13 The
vapor ingested by the user is comprised mainly of concentrated
amounts of nicotine, chemical flavoring, and various additional
chemicals “such as glycol, to retain moisture and create the aerosol
when heated.”14 Since their inception, e-cigarettes have caused a
threatening disruption to the traditional cigarette market as studies
have shown that “cigarette smokers [are] 28 percent more likely to

11

U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note, 5, at 10; T.R. Goldman,
E-Cigarettes and Federal Regulation, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July 18, 2014),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20140718.423628/full/; see Lauren
H. Greenberg, The “Deeming Rule”: The FDA’s Destruction of the Vaping Industry, 83 BROOKLYN L. REV. 777, 783 (2017).
12
See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5, at 10.
13
E-Cigarettes: Facts, Stats and Regulations, TRUTH INITIATIVE (Nov. 11,
2019),
https://truthinitiative.org/research-resources/emerging-tobacco-products/e-cigarettes-facts-stats-and-regulations.
14
Id.; see Erin Coleman, Health Risks of Vaping: What You Need to Know,
BENEFITS BRIDGE UNITED CONCORDIA DENTAL (Jul. 6, 2018), https://benefitsbridge.unitedconcordia.com/health-risks-of-vaping-what-you-need-to-know/.
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stop smoking if they use[] e-cigarettes.”15 Further, the majority of
adult e-cigarette users are comprised of former or current traditional
cigarette smokers.16 By 2018, the global e-cigarette and vaporizer
industry was valued at roughly $14.05 billion.17 This was a major
increase from 2017, when the global industry was valued at $9.39
billion.18 Moreover, some analysts project that by 2026 the market
could reach upwards of $58 billion.19 Perhaps one of the main reasons for the significant and rapid growth of the e-cigarette and vaporizer industry relative to other Nicotine Replacement Therapies
(“NRTs”) is because, unlike other NRTs, e-cigarettes and vaporizers
imitate the act of smoking, thus having “both pharmacologic and
behavioral components of [traditional] cigarette addiction.”20
15

ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC
CIGARETTES ON CIGARETTE SMOKING BY AMERICANS AND ITS HEALTH AND
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS P22 (2019), https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/ECigaretteStudy.pdf; Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists,
Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. REG. 313, 334 (2016) (discussing e-cigarettes threatening disruption).
16
Electronic
Cigarettes:
What’s
The
Bottom
Line,
CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/pdfs/ElectronicCigarettes-Infographic-508.pdf; see Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of
Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 81
Fed. Reg. 28974, 29036 (May 10, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 110; 1140;
1143) [hereinafter Deeming Rule]; Jonathan H. Adler, Regulatory Obstacles to
Harm Reduction: The Case of Smoking, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 712, 722 (2017)
[hereinafter Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction].
17
See Vaping Market to Reach a Value $29.39 Billion at a CAGR of 20.3%
From 2018-2022 | a Report From TBRC, PRNEWSWIRE (Aug. 21, 2019, 9:10
AM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/vaping-market-to-reach-avalue-29-39-billion-at-a-cagr-of-20-3-from-2018-2022--a-report-from-tbrc300904265.html.
18
See Global Electronic Cigarette Market Outlook Report 2017 – 2019 &
2026, PRNEWSWIRE (Sept. 2, 2019, 1:30 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/global-electronic-cigarette-market-outlook-report-2017-2019-2026-300910267.html.
19
See id.
20
Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 722–23 (citing
Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm Reduction
Strategy for Tobacco Control: A Step Forward or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?, 32
J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y. 16, 17 (2011)); see Caroline Franck et. al, Electronic
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Supporters of e-cigarette and vaporizer products advocate that
these devices may provide a safer nicotine alternative for individuals
addicted to smoking traditional cigarettes.21 Various studies focusing on the health risks associated with e-cigarette consumption have
bolstered this argument. For example, the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the “NAS”) recently released
a study, “mandated by Congress,” in which researchers concluded
that “switching to e-cigarettes reduces the exposure to many toxins
and cancer-causing substances in regular cigarettes.”22 Moreover,
the FDA has agreed with these findings stating that, “the inhalation
of nicotine (e.g., nicotine without the products of combustion) is of
less risk to the user than the inhalation of nicotine delivered by
smoke from combusted tobacco products.”23 The prevailing reason
behind this rationale is that, unlike traditional cigarettes, e-cigarette
and vaporizer products are not operated through combustion, and
thus these products do not release the numerous carcinogens that are
present in traditional cigarettes.24 Furthermore, studies have also revealed that the vapor released from e-cigarette usage does not present the equivalent threats of second-hand smoke to bystanders as
traditional cigarettes do.25
Such studies have bolstered the credibility of various public
health experts who advocate for a soft approach in regulating these

Cigarettes in North America History, Use, and Implications for Smoking Cessation, 129 CIRCULATION 1945, 1946 (2014).
21
See Goldman, supra note 11.
22
Stacy Simon, Report: What’s Known About the Harms and Benefits of ECigarettes, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.cancer.org/latestnews/report-whats-known-about-the-harms-and-benefits-of-e-cigarettes.html.
23
Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28981.
24
See Julia Belluz, 4 Big Takeaways from the Most Comprehensive Report
on E-Cigarettes Yet, VOX (Jan. 23, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/1/23/16923070/nas-report-e-cigarettes-health-risks.
(“There is conclusive evidence . . . that completely substituting e-cigarettes for
combustible tobacco cigarettes reduces users’ exposure to numerous toxicants and
carcinogens present in combustible tobacco cigarettes.”).
25
See Ashley Turner, Juul-sponsored Study Shows Secondhand Vaping
Emissions Are Much Less Toxic Than Cigarette Smoke, CNBC (June 14, 2019,
10:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/13/juul-study-shows-secondhandvaping-emissions-are-less-toxic-than-cigarette-smoke.html; Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 725–26.
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alternative tobacco products.26 Advocates of a soft regulatory approach seek to minimize the extent to which e-cigarette regulation
may impede the ability of traditional cigarette smokers to use e-cigarettes as a means of aiding them in their efforts to quit smoking
combustible cigarettes.27 This is because research surrounding these
products indicates the potential for significant public health benefits
for cigarette smokers who transition to e-cigarettes instead.28 In a
May 2014 study, researchers conducted interviews with “nearly
6000 smokers trying to quit on their own and found that about one
in five using e-cigarettes had stopped smoking at the time of the survey, while only half that number—about one in 10—had been able
to stop using conventional nicotine patches and gum.”29 Thus, supporters contend that overly strict regulation of e-cigarettes may prevent individuals from utilizing a less harmful means of nicotine consumption.30
By contrast, advocates for strict regulatory frameworks contend
that the scientific uncertainty surrounding the potential long-term
health effects of e-cigarette and vaping products may render these
devices to be dangerous.31 Moreover, many fear that e-cigarette
marketing may prompt smokers to engage in the dual use of both ecigarettes and traditional cigarettes rather than having the intended
effect of assisting individuals to quit tobacco and nicotine

26
See, e.g., ST. GEORGE’S UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, E-Cigarettes Research
Shows Clear Benefits of Switching from Tobacco, MED. PRESS (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-10-e-cigarettes-benefits-tobacco.html; see
also Adler et al., supra note 15, at 339 n.153 (citing ROYAL COLLEGE OF
PHYSICIANS. NICOTINE WITHOUT SMOKED: TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION (2016)
(encouraging consumption of e-cigarettes in order to curb smoking).
27
See Goldman, supra note, 11.
28
See, e.g., ST. GEORGE’S UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, supra note 26; Adler et
al., supra note 15, at 339.
29
Goldman, supra note 11.
30
See id.; Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Imposes Rules for E-Cigarettes in a
Landmark Move, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/science/fda-rules-electronic-cigarettes.html?smid=plshare.
31
See SHAPIRO & ANEJA, supra note 15, at P7, P40; Mitchell Zeller et al.,
The Strategic Dialogue on Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Vision and Blueprint for
Action in the US, 18 TOB CONTROL 324, 325–26, 331 (2009).
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altogether.32 Furthermore, many public officials express serious
concerns regarding e-cigarette marketing serving as a catalyst for
increased youth nicotine addictions, as e-cigarette usage amongst
our nation’s youth has significantly increased.33 In fact, Health and
Human Services Secretary, Alex Azar, has noted that “[t]he United
States has never seen an epidemic of substance use arise as quickly
as our current epidemic of youth use of e-cigarettes.”34 In November
2019, a report conducted by the Journal of the American Medical
Association revealed “that more than 1 in 4 high school students
(more than 5 million teens nationwide) now use flavored e-cigarettes monthly, a significant increase from last year . . . .”35 This astronomical figure is even more concerning when coupled with the
opinions of medical professionals such as Dr. Tom Frieden of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”), who believes that increased use of e-cigarette products by the nation’s
youth will likely lead them to become addicted to traditional cigarettes as well.36 As a result, public officials have been met with significant pressure to take measures to reduce youth exposure to ecigarettes.37
While e-cigarettes and vaporizer products remained largely unregulated for many years following their introduction into the U.S.
32

See Janine K. Cataldo et. al, E-Cigarette Marketing and Older Smokers:
Road to Renormalization, AM. J. HEALTH BEHAV. 361, 369 (2015),
https://www.bhthechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Handout5-E-Cigarettes-and-Older-Adults.pdf. (“[E]-cigarette advertising promotes dual use and
may contribute to the renormalization of smoking.”); Regulatory Obstacles to
Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 752 (citing David B. Abrams, Promise and
Peril of E-Cigarettes: Can Disruptive Technology Make Cigarettes Obsolete?,
311 JAMA 135 (2014)).
33
See Matt Richtel, Use of E-Cigarettes by Young People Is Major Concern,
Surgeon General Declares, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/health/ecigarettes-united-states.html.
34
See Dan Vergano, Trump Just Announced a Nationwide Ban of All Vape
Flavors Except Tobacco and Menthol, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan 2, 2020, 5:17 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/trump-juul-flavor-ban.
35
Id.
36
See Karen Kaplan, CDC Director Explains What He Hates About Electronic Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-why-tom-frieden-hates-electronic-cigarettes-cdc20140429-story.html.
37
See Vergano, supra note 34.
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marketplace,38 health studies highlighting the potentially dangerous
effects of these devices provided the federal government with significant motivation to more closely examine the need for a stricter
regulatory approach in the interest of protecting public health.39 In a
2009 study conducted by the FDA, researchers discovered “detectable levels of toxic cancer-causing chemicals, including an ingredient used in antifreeze, in two leading brands of e-cigarettes and 18
various cartridges.”40 Additionally, a 2014 study revealed that “aerosol from e-cigarettes with a higher voltage level contains more formaldehyde, another carcinogen with the potential to cause cancer.”41
Moreover, in 2016, researchers determined that “people who use[]
e-cigarettes [are] 30 percent more likely to . . . develop[] a chronic
lung disease, including asthma, bronchitis and emphysema, than
nonusers.”42 Most recently, in 2019, the American Journal of Preventive Medicine assessed the impact of e-cigarettes on the human
respiratory system and concluded that “people who use only e-cigarettes increase their risk of developing lung disease by about 30%
compared with nonusers.”43 Despite these medical findings, however, strict regulatory measures for ENDS products remained
38

See Goldman, supra note 11.
See FDA Warns of Health Risks Posed by E-Cigarettes, FDA (July 2009),
https://www.casaa.org/wp-content/uploads/FDA-Press-Release-2009.pdf;
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 784.
40
Dieter Holger, 7 Reasons E-Cigarettes Are Bad, INQUISITR (Aug. 30,
2015), https://www.inquisitr.com/2378144/7-reasons-e-cigarettes-are-bad/; Are
Electronic Cigarettes Safe?, PIEDMONT HEALTHCARE, https://www.piedmont.org/living-better/are-electronic-cigarettes-safe.
41
Mary Brophy Marcus, E-Cigarette Flavorings Linked With Lung Disease,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:21 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/e-cigaretteflavorings-linked-with-lung-disease/; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 784 (quoting
E-Cigarettes and Lung Health, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://eee.lung.org./stop-smoking/smoking/smoking-facts/e-cigarettes-and-lung-health.html
[https://perma.cc/VR3S-ZUNV].).
42
Erika Edwards, E-Cigarettes Linked to Lung Problems, First Long-term
Study on Vaping Finds, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019, 6:36 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/vaping/e-cigarettes-linked-lung-problemsfirst-long-term-study-vaping-n1101641.
43
Kathleen Raven, Teen Vaping Linked to More Health Risks, YALE MED.
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.yalemedicine.org/stories/teen-vaping/ (citing
Dharma N. Bhatta & Stanton A. Glantz, Association of E-Cigarette Use with Respiratory Disease Among Adults: A Longitudinal Analysis, 58 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 182, 182–90 (2019)).
39
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largely unenforced by the federal government until a nationwide
“outbreak” of severe lung injuries took the public by storm.44
II.
THE FALL: RECENT OUTBREAKS
The sale of e-cigarettes and vaporizers in the United States market has steadily increased for nearly a decade.45 Widely publicized
reports of serious vaping-related illnesses beginning in 2019, however, set the stage for what some public health officials consider to
be our most recent “public health crisis.”46 The highly-publicized
outbreaks of vaping-linked lung illnesses were first brought to the
nation’s attention by the Illinois and Wisconsin state health departments in April 2019.47 Those departments tracked 53 patients,
mostly young adult males, who were hospitalized after having reported serious “coughing, chest pain or shortness of breath.”48 Since
April 2019, there have been over 2,000 cases of vaping-linked illnesses arising in every state in the nation.49 Of those 2,000 + cases,
the CDC has confirmed at least 57 deaths in 27 states.50 Further,
many victims who were fortunate to have escaped death “have
ended up with acute respiratory distress syndrome, a life-threatening
condition in which fluid builds up in the lungs and prevents [] oxygen . . . from circulating in the bloodstream.”51 While these mysterious vaping-linked illnesses perplexed medical officials for months,
44
Matthew Sprankle & Audrey Davis, Up in Smoke: The Countdown on Vape
Enforcement Discretion Begins, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN: HEALTH L. ADVISOR
BLOG (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/2019/08/13/up-insmoke-the-countdown-on-vape-enforcement-discretion-begins/; see Vergano, supra note 34.
45
See Knowles & Sun, supra note 6.
46
Is a Vaping-Linked Lung Illness a Public Health Crisis? That Depends On
Who You Ask, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 8, 2019, 2:54 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/is-a-vaping-linked-lung-illness-a-publichealth-crisis-that-depends-on-who-you-ask; Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated
with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products, CDC (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:00 PM),
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html.
47
See Knowles & Sun, supra note 6.
48
See id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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on November 8, 2019, “CDC officials announced a ‘breakthrough’
discovery” in their efforts to identify the precise cause of this newly
identified lung disease formally named EVALI (the acronym stands
for e-cigarette or vaping product use-associated lung injury).52
The CDC stated that vitamin E acetate, a chemical commonly
found in some THC products, appeared to be the likely culprit causing the recent EVALI outbreaks.53 That said, CDC officials noted
that their discoveries were “inconclusive,” stating that “more than
one chemical could be contributing” to the vaping-linked illnesses.54
Although inconclusive, data collected by the CDC surrounding
EVALI outbreaks shows a strong correlation between the presence
of vitamin E acetate in the bodies of victims and the inhalation of
vaporized THC products.55 In fact, the CDC announced that “nearly
83 percent of 1,184 patients for whom relevant data is available reported using THC-containing products, [the psychoactive component of marijuana], in the three months before [developing] their
symptoms.”56 That said, 13% of victims reported to have only vaped
nicotine-containing products.57 Of that 13%, however, doctors have
noted that some of the patients who stated that they had only vaped
nicotine products tested positive for THC in their urine.58 Given this
inconsistency, some doctors believe that patients are unwilling to
admit having used marijuana, likely because the substance is illegal
under federal law.59 Thus, with no conclusively identified singular
cause of EVALI, the CDC has continued to actively compel those at
higher risk, including young adults, to refrain from using all e-cigarette and vaping-related products.60 Moreover, in the interest of
52

Id.; Raven, supra note 43; E-Cigarette or Vaping Product Use-Associated
Lung Injury (EVALI), YALE MED, https://www.yalemedicine.org/conditions/evali.
53
Raven, supra note 43.
54
Id.
55
See Knowles & Sun, supra note 6.
56
Id.; see Marijuana Research Report: How does marijuana produce its effects?, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/how-does-marijuana-produce-its-effects.
57
Knowles & Sun, supra note 6.
58
Id.
59
See id.
60
Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products, supra note 46.
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protecting the public health of their citizens, various state and local
officials have taken regulatory matters into their own hands.61
On September 24, 2019, in response to the suspected link between the use of e-cigarette and vaping products and EVALI, “Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker declared a public health emergency . . . call[ing] for a ban on the sale of all flavored and non-flavored vaping products and devices, including tobacco and marijuana.”62 This public health emergency enforced a four-month ban on
the sale of all vaping-related products both online and in retail
stores.63 The decision to fully restrict the sale of these devices arose,
in some part, because of “the absence of strong federal action by the
FDA that is forcing states to have to make choices like this on how
they are going to protect from e-cigarettes,” said Governor Baker.64
That said, the seemingly abrupt and strict regulatory measures taken
by Governor Baker were met with significant pushback from local
retailers and consumers contending, among other things, that the
governor’s decision would “push[] people into the illicit market—
precisely where the dangerous products are—[the decision] goes
against every principle of public health and harm reduction.”65 Further, in addition to opposition at the state level, the federal government has also been faced with strong challenges regarding its current
regulatory framework for e-cigarette and vaping products.66

61
See, e.g., Matt Stout, Baker Declares Public Health Emergency, Orders 4month Ban on All Vaping Products, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 24, 2019, 2:13 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/marijuana/2019/09/24/governor-bakermake-vaping-announcement-amid-spate-lung-illnesses/o8sO6mf3GOmX4mOpLLtcEL/story.html.
62
States and Tribes Stepping in to Protect Communities from the Dangers of
E-Cigarettes: Actions and Options (2020), PUB. HEALTH L. CTR. (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/resources/states-and-tribes-stepping-protect-communities-dangers-e-cigarettes-actions-and-options.
63
Mark Fortier et al., Sale of Vaping Products Temporarily Banned in Massachusetts as Gov. Baker Declares Public Health Emergency, NBC BOSTON
(Sept. 25, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/gov-charliebaker-to-make-announcement-about-vaping-in-massachusetts/115821/.
64
Id.
65
See Stout, supra note 61.
66
See, e.g., Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 F. Supp. 3d. 360, 366 (D.D.C.
2017).
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III.

FDA REGULATION: THE DEEMING RULE & PRE-MARKET
APPROVAL
The federal government has regulated the tobacco industry since
1965 when Congress first passed the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the “CLAA”).67 This legislation came on the heels of the
1964 Surgeon General’s report, which first brought significant attention to the serious health risks caused by smoking cigarettes.68 As
a result, the passage of the 1965 CLAA imposed new rules requiring
warning labels to be placed on all cigarette packages in order to increase the public’s knowledge regarding the serious health risks associated with cigarettes.69 Since then, a myriad of tobacco control
laws have been implemented at the federal level relating to youth
access, labeling, and marketing.70 The inherent structure of tobacco
regulation, however, remained largely unaltered until a series of litigation arose in the 1990s, resulting in “the largest privately negotiated transfer of wealth arising out of litigation in world history.”71
During that decade, a compilation of states’ attorneys generals
worked together to sue the largest tobacco companies in a tort liability suit, seeking compensation for health care costs incurred as a
result of “treating sick and dying cigarette smokers.”72 By 1998, the
four largest cigarette manufacturers entered into “The Master Settlement Agreement” (the “MSA”) with forty-six states, which required, among other things, that the companies pay roughly $12.75
67
See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39
(1965); see also Matthew R. Herington, Tobacco Regulation in the United States:
New Opportunities and Challenges, 23 HEALTH L. 13, 13–15 (2010).
68
CDC, History of the Surgeon General’s Reports on Smoking and Health,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/history/index.htm; Regulatory
Obstacles to Harm Reduction: The Case of Smoking, supra note 16, at 715.
69
See Kelly A. Moore, Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965, CENGAGE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/federal-cigarette-labeling-and-advertising-act-1965; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 780.
70
See Herington, supra note 67, at 13–15.
71
See Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2008); Regulatory
Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 716; Greenberg, supra note 11,
at 781.
72
Master Settlement Agreement: An Overview, PUB. HEALTH LAW CENTER,
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-msaoverview-2015.pdf; see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 781.
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billion annually to the states, agree to increased restrictions on their
marketing and advertising practices in addition to an imposed tax
that would increase the price of cigarettes.73 Although, before the
MSA, lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers were primarily initiated by private individuals seeking compensation for their injuries
derived from cigarette usage.74 Much of this private litigation, however, proved to be unsuccessful as plaintiffs encountered challenging hurdles surrounding their claims of deceptive marketing practices because, by then, all cigarette packages had provided “government-mandated warning[s].”75 As a result, this reinforced the large
tobacco companies successful defenses in claiming that the plaintiffs had assumed the risk of using cigarettes.76 That being said, unlike the private lawsuits, the lawsuits initiated by the states’ attorneys general were more powerful because the assumption of risk
defense did not apply in the states’ suits.77 As one attorney general
explained, “[t]his time, the industry cannot claim that a smoker
knew full well what risks he took each time he lit up. The state of
Mississippi never smoked a cigarette. Yet it has paid the medical
expenses of thousands of indigent smokers who did.”78 As a result,
the tobacco companies both recognized and appreciated the lurking
threat of being faced with aggressive lawsuits by upwards of 50
states, and thus they agreed to a revolutionary settlement deal with
the states, paving the way for progressive tobacco regulation to
come.79
73

Master Settlement Agreement: An Overview, supra note 72, at 2–3; see
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 781; Yandle et al., supra note 71, at 1227.
74
See Adler et al., supra note 15, at 327 (citing Yandle et al., supra note 71,
at 1259–63.).
75
See id.
76
See Stephen D. Sugarman, Mixed Results From Recent United States Tobacco Litigation, 10 TORT REV. 1, 3 (2002); Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial
Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
897, 904 (1998).
77
See Adler et al., supra note 15, at 327; Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco
Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State Governments. Repairing the
Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 571–72 (2001).
78
Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and
Protect Children, 83 A.B.A. J, 53, 53 (1997); see DeBow, supra note 77, at 572.
79
See Jess Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco
Litigation to Obesity Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREV. MED., 82, 83 (2006); Adler et al.,
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While the MSA laid the groundwork for cigarette regulatory
measures, it did not possess “the force of federal law.”80 Years after
the MSA, however, Congress passed the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“The Tobacco Control Act” or
“The Act”), which gave the FDA significant power to regulate tobacco products in various ways.81 Specifically, the Tobacco Control
Act enabled the FDA to require cigarette manufacturers to disclose
all of the “health information, including lists of ingredients by brand
and sub-brand, descriptions of nicotine delivery [content], and documentation of the health effects of each product” they sold.82 Perhaps most notably, the Act also imposed significant regulations on
the marketing and advertising of modified risk products.83 Under the
2009 legislation, a modified risk product constitutes “any tobacco
product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk
of tobacco-related disease associated with commercially marketed
tobacco products.”84 Thus, if a cigarette manufacturer seeks to market their product as being less harmful compared to other tobacco
products, they are required “to support that claim with scientific evidence” that “demonstrate[s] that the product will or is expected to
benefit the health of the population as a whole,” before they can receive FDA approval.85 The Tobacco Control Act, however, when
initially signed into law, did not extend its regulatory power over all
types of tobacco-related products.86

supra note 15, at 327–28; DeBow, supra note 77, at 567–68; Greenberg, supra
note 11, at 781.
80
See Adler et al., supra note 15, at 330.
81
21 U.S.C. § 387a–1; see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 781; Adler et al.,
supra note 15, at 332.
82
A Deeming Regulation: What is Possible Under the Law, PUB. HEALTH L.
CENTER https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclcfs-deeming-reg-what-is-possible-2014.pdf.
83
Id.; see Adler et al., supra note 15, at 332.
84
21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(1).
85
See Modified Risk Tobacco Products, FDA (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/advertising-and-promotion/modifiedrisk-tobacco-products; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 782.
86
See Goldman supra note 11; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 783.
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A.
Introducing: The Deeming Rule
Non-tobacco nicotine delivery products such as vaporizers and
e-cigarettes, remained unregulated by the Tobacco Control Act at
the time of its passage.87 Thus, the “major gap in regulation”88 presented policymakers with difficult questions regarding how to fit
these new electronic nicotine delivery systems into the previously
existing tobacco regulatory regime.89 Because the Tobacco Control
Act granted the FDA regulatory authority over “cigarettes, cigarette
tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless tobacco and to any
other tobacco products that the Secretary by regulation deems to be
subject to this subchapter,” however, the agency was granted the
legislative discretion to deem e-cigarettes and numerous other devices as “tobacco products” subject to the Act.90
Despite this broad grant of authority by Congress in 2009, the
FDA refrained from taking any action to deem previously unregulated tobacco products to be subject to the Tobacco Control Act until
2016.91 In May of 2016, the FDA acted on its authority to impose a
new rule that would deem e-cigarettes and other previously unregulated tobacco products to be subject to all of the Tobacco Control
Act’s requirements and to even further FDA product regulation.92
The primary basis for the agency’s decision was to learn more about
the potential for harm to public health.93 Not only did the Deeming
Rule subject e-cigarettes and other vaporizer devices to new regulations, the rule was also extended to include, among other things,

87

See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 783.
Id.
89
See Wendy E. Parmet, Paternalism, Self-Governance, and Public Health:
The Case of E-Cigarettes, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 879, 883 (2016).
90
See 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b) (emphasis added); Adler et al., supra note 15, at
332–33.
91
See Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28974; Katelyn Newman, Vaping and
E-Cigarettes: The New Public Health Problem, US NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019 at 9:00
AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2019-0930/vaping-and-e-cigarettes-a-new-public-health-problem.
92
See Newman, supra note 91.
93
Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28983; see Regulatory Obstacles to Harm
Reduction, supra note 16, at 733–34.
88
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various components and parts of e-cigarettes and vaporizers such as
their batteries, cartridges, e-liquids, and even device software.94
Further, FDA enforcement of the Deeming Rule also required
that e-cigarette and vaporizer manufacturers be subjected to a “mandatory approval process that could hamstring all but the largest ecigarette producers.”95 Specifically, the Rule requires all “manufacturers of newly regulated tobacco products, that were not on the market as of February 15, 2007, . . . to show that [their] products meet
the applicable public health standard set by the law. And those manufacturers will have to receive marketing authorization from the
FDA.”96 In order to meet the applicable public health standards,
manufacturers must submit an application to the FDA sufficiently
demonstrating that its brand of e-cigarette is substantially equivalent
to a product that was on the market in 2007.97 Given the recency of
e-cigarette innovations, however, there were little to no commercially marketed e-cigarettes as of February 15, 2007.98 Therefore,
many industry leaders and even the FDA has acknowledged that
nearly every e-cigarette company and product on the market will be
unable to meet this required showing of substantial equivalence,
and, as a result, companies will need to go through a procedure of
premarket review prior to being permitted to lawfully sell their products in the U.S. marketplace.99
B.
Pre-market Tobacco Applications (“PMTAs”)
Acquiring premarket approval, in most cases, poses significant
challenges for the vast majority of e-cigarette and vaporizer
94

Deeming Rule supra note 16, at 28975; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 786–
87; see Adler, supra note 16, at 739.
95
Adler et al., supra note 15, at 314 (citing Tavernise, supra note 30.).
96
The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, FDA (Jun. 16, 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/facts-fdas-new-tobacco-rule;
see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 787.
97
See 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a).
98
See Historical Timeline of Electronic Cigarettes, CASAA,
http://www.casaa.org/historical-timeline-of-electronic-cigarettes/; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 787; Parmet, supra note 89, at 941.
99
See Jacob Sullum,’Tobacco Products’ That Aren’t, REASON (May 5, 2014,
8:30 AM), https://reason.com/2014/05/05/tobacco-products-that-arent/; Parmet,
supra note 89, at 941 (citing The FDA & Deeming Regulations of E-Cigarettes,
CASAA (Mar. 3, 2013), http://casaa.org/deeming_ regulations.html.).
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manufacturers who seek to lawfully sell their products in the U.S.
marketplace.100 In April of 2020, a U.S. District Court judge in Maryland issued a revised order requiring that companies engaged in the
sale of e-cigarette devices prior to the August 8, 2016, passage of
the Deeming Rule submit applications for market approval by September 9, 2020, in order to continue selling their products.101 Companies that did not have products on the market prior to the August
8, 2016, passage of the Deeming Rule must submit a PMTA and
receive FDA approval before being permitted to engage in the lawful sale of their products.102 Furthermore, the rule exempts traditional tobacco products from the PMTA requirements because
nearly all traditional cigarettes were marketed prior to 2007, grandfathering those products in.103 Such a rule of construction provides
a windfall to the big tobacco companies because if e-cigarette manufacturers are forced out of business due to an inability to meet the
financial burdens of the PMTA requirements, then the big tobacco
companies would have less competition.104
PMTAs require that manufacturers begin by providing samples
of their products along with “descriptive information” about their
product’s “formulation and design, the nicotine strength, [and] instructions for its use.”105 Further, manufacturers must also include
“detailed scientific studies and analyses of research findings,”106
100

See Tavernise, supra note 30.
Azim Chowdhury & Eric Gotting, Maryland District Court Extends Premarket Application Submission Deadline to September 9, 2020 in Light of Coronavirus Outbreak; Appeal of the Merits Continues with the Fourth Circuit,
CONTINUUM RISK (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.thecontinuumofrisk.com/
2020/04/maryland-district-court-extends-pmta-submission-deadline-to-september-9-2020-in-light-of-coronavirus-outbreak-appeal-of-the-merits-continueswith-the-fourth-circuit/; see American Academy of Pediatrics, et al. v. FDA, et
al., No. 8:18-cv-00883, Docket No. 182 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2020) (modifying a
remedy order).
102
See Sprankle & Davis, supra note 44.
103
See Sullum, supra note 99.
104
See Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 740–41
(citing Tavernise, supra note 30); Sheila Kaplan, F.D.A. Delays Rules That Would
Have Limited E-Cigarettes on Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/health/electronic-cigarette-tobacco-nicotine-fda.html.
105
Sprankle & Davis, supra note 44.
106
Id.
101
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which “show the health risks of such tobacco product and whether
such tobacco product presents less risk than other tobacco products.”107 Finally, each PMTA must also include “information on
how to minimize the risks associated with ENDS batteries and to
address the likelihood of use and misuse leading to overheating, fire,
and explosion.”108
Before a manufacturer submits their PMTA and receives FDA
approval, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any commercial statements that “explicitly or implicitly” state that a product
“presents a lower risk of tobacco-related disease or is less harmful
than one or more other commercially marketed tobacco products, . . . contains a reduced level of a substance or presents a reduced exposure to a substance, . . . or does not contain or is free of
a substance.”109 Interestingly, manufacturers are even prohibited
from repeating the FDA’s own statements regarding the health risks
of e-cigarettes relative to traditional cigarettes.110 Thus, despite the
fact that FDA has publicly stated that “the inhalation of nicotine
(e.g., nicotine without the products of combustion) is of less risk to
the user than the inhalation of nicotine delivered by smoke from
combusted tobacco products,” manufacturers are prohibited from including this statement in any form of product advertising without
first having their PMTA approved by the FDA.111 Furthermore,
prior to receiving the FDA’s blessing, “[a]n electronic cigarette
company cannot even inform consumers that the[ir] product does
not produce smoke.”112
Acquiring PMTA approval poses significant challenges for
manufacturers because of how expensive and time-consuming the
process is.113 The FDA has estimated that the research costs associated with gathering the required data for a single product to be

107

Greenberg, supra note 11, at 788; see 21 U.S.C. § 387j(b)(1)(A).
Sprankle & Davis, supra note 44.
109
See Adler, supra note 9.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See Sullum, supra note 99.
113
See Tavernise, supra note 30; Susan Adams, E-Cigarette Manufacturers
Say New Regulations Will Devastate The Industry, FORBES (May 5, 2016, 3:01
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2016/05/05/e-cigarette-manufacturers-say-new-regulations-will-devastate-the-industry/#4a9ea62266d4.
108
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between $117,000 and $466,000.114 The magnitude of these costs is
extreme given that manufacturers are required to submit a PMTA
for each individual product, which includes each “differing flavor
variant” and each level of “nicotine strength” offered.115 All alterations in product design and packaging, are also treated as a different
product.116 Thus, because most manufacturers of e-cigarettes and
vaping products produce numerous different flavors and varying
levels of nicotine content, the total cost of filing applications for all
of a manufacturer’s products may cost millions of dollars.117 For example, Apollo Electronic Cigarettes, one of the more popular manufacturers in the vaping industry,118 produces over a dozen different
flavors of vaping liquid, each of which are available in five varying
levels of nicotine content.119 The company would be required to submit 60 individual PMTAs in order to keep producing and selling
their flavor options after the May 2020 deadline,.120 Thus, Apollo
Electronic Cigarettes’ total costs for filling applications for all of its
products would run the company between roughly $7,000,000 and
$28,000,000 with no guarantee that their product applications will
even receive FDA approval.121 In addition to the costly prices,
PMTAs are also significantly time-consuming as the FDA estimates
that the process for filing a PMTA “will require 1,500 hours per
114

See FDA, Commonly Asked Questions: About the Center for Tobacco
Products (Jun. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/about-center-tobacco-products-ctp/commonly-asked-questions-about-center-tobacco-products.
115
Id.; see Kaleigh Rogers, Five Ways the FDA’s New Regulations Will
Transform the Vaping Industry, VICE (May 5, 2016, 4:50 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xa3kq/five-ways-the-fdas-new-regulationswith-transform-the-vaping-industry-e-cigarettes; Regulatory Hurdles to Harm
Reduction, supra note 16, at 738; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 790.
116
See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DEMONSTRATING THE SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENCE OF A NEW TOBACCO PRODUCT: RESPONSES TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (EDITION 3) 3 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM436468.pdf; Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 738.
117
See Rogers, supra note 114.
118
See Apollo E-Cigarette and E-Liquids – Popular, Reliable, Affordable,
BEST E-CIGARETTE GUIDE (Jan. 24, 2020), https://best-e-cigarette-guide.com/ecigarette-reviews/apollo-ecigarette-and-e-liquids-popular-reliable-affordable/.
119
Id.; see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 790 (analyzing impact on time-consumption for Apollo e-cigarettes to submit 60 PMTAs).
120
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 790.
121
See id. at 789–90.
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product.”122 As a result, Apollo Electronic Cigarettes would likely
need to spend approximately 90,000 hours in order to obtain FDA
approval for all the variations of their product.123 What this demonstrates is that manufacturers could potentially spend thousands of
hours and millions of dollars in preparation for PMTA filings without the guarantee that their applications are even going to be approved. In fact, as of November 2019, the FDA had received 389
PMTAs.124 Of those 389 applications, only one has been granted
FDA approval for an e-cigarette product.125 The application was
submitted by Philip Morris, one of the largest and most profitable
cigarette manufacturers in the tobacco industry.126 Thus, in the eyes
of the American Vaping Association, this regulatory procedure “is
not regulation—it is prohibition.”127
Given the infancy of the vaping industry, it is important to note
that the majority of manufacturers are not entities such as Big
Pharma or Big Tobacco, which have the resources to take on these
extreme PMTA requirements.128 Instead, the burdensome PMTA requirements threaten to eviscerate smaller businesses who simply do
not have the financial resources to conduct sufficient research in order to have their applications approved.129 Furthermore, assuming
that a manufacturer does have the necessary resources to receive
122

Id. at 789–90 (citing Rogers, supra note 115).
Id.
124
Tara Lin Couch & Mark J. Vaders, FDA Holds Public Meeting on PMTAs
for Deemed Products Meeting Summary, FOOD & DRUG L. INST. (Nov. 2019),
https://www.fdli.org/2019/11/fda-holds-public-meeting-on-pmtas-for-deemedproducts-meeting-summary/.
125
Id.
126
Id.; see The Facts about Philip Morris International: Company Is Cause
of the Tobacco Problem, Not the Solution, TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/industry-watch/pmi-foundation/bad-acts (last visited May 15, 2021); Press Release, FDA, FDA permits sale of IQOS Tobacco
Heating System Through Premarket Tobacco Product Application Pathway (Apr.
30, 2019); Tomi Kilgore, Philip Morris’s Stock Gains After Profit, Revenue Beat
Expectations (Oct. 20, 2020, 7:11 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
philip-morriss-stock-gains-after-profit-revenue-beat-expectations-2020-10-20.
127
Tavernise, supra note 30.
128
See Adams, supra note 113.
129
See id.; Shari Rudavsky, Indiana Vape Shop Owners Say New FDA Rule
Will Crush Industry, INDY STAR (May 9, 2016), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/05/08/indiana-vape-shop-owners-say-new-fda-rulecrush-industry/84036264/.
123
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application approval, the increased costs that the company will absorb from PMTA requirements will inevitably drive up the purchase
price of their products for the consumer. Due to the heightened costs
of production, companies will be forced to increase the price of their
products in order to maintain their revenue figures.130 As a result,
this mark-up in price will likely have an adverse effect on consumers
by compelling them to purchase deadly, traditional cigarettes as opposed to more expensive, but less harmful e-cigarettes.131
Moreover, one of the most serious concerns arising from this
regulatory framework is “stifling innovation.”132 As a result of the
immense costs, time, and research requirements, which are beyond
the reach of most manufacturers, companies will have significantly
less incentive to invest in innovative technologies to develop new
safer alternatives to traditional cigarettes.133 This serious disruption
to the advancements of public health may very well reinvigorate a
tobacco market dominated, once again, by traditional cigarettes scientifically proven to cause death and serious disease.134
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, the FDA has maintained its position that imposing the deeming regulations on e-cigarette and vaping products will aid in protecting public health.135 The
agency, however, failed to identify and quantify the specific health
benefits that would result from such a broad extension of the Deeming Rule. Indeed, the FDA has even conceded that the “direct benefits of making each of the newly deemed tobacco products subject
to the requirements of chapter IX of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic]
Act are difficult to quantify, and [the FDA] cannot predict the size
130

See Rudavsky, supra note 129.
See id.; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 798–99.
132
See Gregory Conley, Use Common Sense on E-Cigarettes, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (July 30, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/07/30/fda-should-not-classify-e-cigarettes-as-tobacco-products;
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 798; Adler, supra note 16, at 752 (citing Abrams,
supra note 32).
133
See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 799 (citing Michael Siegel, POV: New
FDA Regulations on Vaping Products a Failure, BU TODAY (July 13, 2016),
https://www.bu.edu/articles/2016/fda-vaping-regulations).
134
See Abrams, supra note 32, at 135; Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction , supra note 16, at 752.
135
See Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 741 (citing
The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, supra note 96).
131
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of these benefits at this time.”136 Thus, although the FDA has publicly affirmed their own findings regarding the lessened health risks
of e-cigarettes relative to traditional cigarettes,137 the agency remains committed to the proposition that the regulation of e-cigarettes as traditional cigarettes is necessary to “benefit public health,”
despite the fact that they are not certain as to how.138
Under the current FDA regulatory framework, the decision to
regulate e-cigarettes in an identical fashion to that of traditional tobacco cigarettes poses undeniable constraints on innovation and
threatens to undo the substantial progress made to reduce cigaretterelated injuries.139 As stated in the Journal of the American Medical
Association,
Applying overly burdensome, expensive regulatory
hurdles to e-cigarettes could stifle innovation and favor the market domination of tobacco companies,
which potentially promote dual use of cigarettes and
e-cigarettes to minimize losing market share for their
primary cigarette products. Independent e-cigarette
companies . . . are more likely to have the goal of
eliminating combusted cigarettes.140
While e-cigarettes are not free of all health risks, what is clear is that
they have the potential to produce public health benefits by providing a less harmful alternative to a scientifically proven lethal product.141 As such, this Note does not advocate for the proposition that
e-cigarettes should go completely unregulated, but rather that society would benefit from an elastic regulatory framework capable of
building in adjustment as the facts change. The remaining question
becomes what type of regulatory framework is flexible enough to
136

Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28981; see Regulatory Obstacles to Harm
Reduction, supra note 16, at 741; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 797.
137
Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28984; see Adler, supra note 9.
138
Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28984; Regulatory Obstacles to Harm
Reduction, supra note 16, at 741.
139
See Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 752.
140
Id. (citing Abrams, supra note 32, at 135); Abrams, supra note 32, at 135
(citing Riccardo Polosa & Pasquale Caponnetto, Time for Evidence-based E-Cigarette Regulation, 14 LANCET 582, 582–83 (2013).
141
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 22; Smoking and Tobacco Use: Fast Facts,
supra note 1.
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minimize the risks of products that are not yet fully understood without hindering the development and industry growth of products with
potentially large public health value. The answer may be found
through the use of state tort law as “civil courts provide an alternative governmental arena for implementing and sometimes developing public polic[y] . . . .”142
IV.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY: BALANCING DETERRENCE AND
INCENTIVIZATION
Products liability theory serves to benefit both individual victims
and society as a whole.143 In general, tort law and products liability
suits have three main goals.144 The first goal, on the individual level,
is to serve as a vehicle for injured victims to receive compensation
for their product-related injuries.145 This compensation may “include economic losses such as medical expenses or lost wages, and
noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering.”146 Second, products liability suits serve a social function of deterring manufacturers
from producing unsafe products.147 This deterrence function occurs
mainly by punishing product manufacturers “through [the] assessment of punitive damages.”148 Third, there are economic goals of
products liability theory that also seek to provide a benefit to society.
In general, tort law seeks to allocate resources efficiently “by attributing the social costs of accidents to those who cause them—for example, irresponsible corporations.”149 Thus, while products liability
suits and federal regulation both serve to benefit the public health
by preventing “the production [and] use of unsafe products,”
142
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products liability suits provide the added functions of victim compensation and social punishment.150 Social deterrence and the threat
of punishment through punitive damages can be strong motivating
factors by which products are forced to be made safer.151 In fact, in
the case of Big Tobacco, R.J. Reynolds began engaging in measures
to develop a safer traditional cigarette and desired to inform consumers about these plans.152 Before the company could spread the
news, however, their attorney swiftly warned Reynolds to refrain
from taking such action “because of two words: product liability.”153
In November 2019, Apple made the decision to remove “181
vaping apps from its online store.”154 Many of those now prohibited
apps contain software that allows the user to configure various settings on their vape devices including the temperature at which vape
fluids are vaporized.155 Thus, following the lead of recent state and
federal regulations, Apple has taken steps to “distance itself” from
various manufacturing companies in the vaping industry.156 This
raises interesting questions as to whether intermediaries such as Apple are exposed to liability when they provide a marketplace for
products that may or may not be dangerous. The answer to this question is likely no given that generally, under United States law, intermediaries that provide an online marketplace for mobile applications are protected against liability for the conduct of independent
third-party app developers in a similar way to how online marketplace providers like Amazon are generally not liable for product defects arising in products manufactured by third-parties and sold
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through Amazon’s platform.157 This remains true “even if the [intermediaries] take an active role in selecting the apps.”158
Despite this legal protection for intermediaries like Apple, what
seems implicit in the background is the notion that if and when dangerous products result in consumer injuries, companies fear threats
of liability.159 Thus, what seems relatively apparent is that federal
regulation is not the only concern for e-cigarette and vaporizer manufactures who wish to profit from the sale of their products. Without
access to large online marketplaces such as Apple and other equivalent business entities, various e-cigarette and vaporizer manufacturers face the danger of significant product marginalization.160
Thus, Apple may have the leverage to presumably impose significant regulatory responses on e-cigarette and vaporizer manufacturers who wish to sell their products in online marketplaces even before the courts get involved. In an effort to carefully avoid liability,
Apple may, however, risk being careless in looking closely at the
governing bodies of law when determining if they truly could face
exposure to liability for marketing these applications.
That being said, if Apple decides to preclude marketplace entry
to a substantial portion of the vaping industry, it could potentially
face impending lawsuits by the manufacturers. In the event that Apple proceeds with this course of action, small businesses are going
to be denied access to a large online marketplace, which may cause
some of the businesses to fail and could inevitably lead those
157
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businesses to bring lawsuits against Apple claiming tortious interference.161 This begs the question of whether those businesses would
have a viable claim for tortious interference if Apple precludes them
from a large online marketplace while lacking sufficient knowledge
regarding whether e-cigarette and vaporizers actually pose a significant public health risk. Although not a topic for this Note, there
seems to be a potential for valid claims of tortious interference with
contractual relations under these circumstances.162
What this example demonstrates is that corporations have a significant interest in taking measures to avoid exposure to tort liability
claims.163 Thus, if there is truth to the notion that the threat of tort
liability is capable of imposing self-regulation on the e-cigarette and
vaping industries, it begs the question of what added benefit strict
federal regulation provides in managing the potential uncertainties
associated with these products. The Master Settlement Agreement,
which was struck between the States and the largest cigarette manufacturers, is a prime example of how the threat of tort liability has
the power to force regulatory measures upon large corporations.164
Furthermore, even if FDA requirements are fulfilled, in most cases,
“compliance with federal . . . regulations does not preclude a jury
from concluding that the product is unsafe, either because the design
is defective or the warnings inadequate.”165 Thus, courts may find
that a product has a defective design or an inadequate warning even
if the product contains the FDA mandated language in its warning
labels and the agency has approved the product as being safe.166 This
is not an unusual occurrence as “one trial lawyer [has] asserted that
161
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‘an effective presentation can be made in court that the FDA’s standards . . . do not preclude recovery since they are so ineffectual as to
be virtually meaningless.’”167 Therefore, perhaps the most flexible
and efficient way of regulating innovative modified risk tobacco
products can be achieved through product liability claims based on
state tort law with some federal regulatory measures enforced. This
contention finds its support by analyzing the historical reformation
of the Big Tobacco industry, which demonstrates that while governmental legislation can, at times, lend itself to constructive regulation, “litigation is often necessary to affect industry practices at the
national level.”168
State tort law causes of action have historically provided consumers of tobacco-related products with remedies for injuries incurred as a result of deceptive or misleading product warnings.169
Further, Congress has acknowledged that private litigation has
played an essential role in exposing tobacco industry practices in
addition to effective regulatory measures necessary to combat those
practices.170 It is the adversarial nature of litigation that is capable
and arguably most effective for exposing both the dangers of specific products in addition to any deceptive or misleading claims,
warnings, or product labeling.171 Tort law liability suits do, however, have drawbacks as they may not always serve as an effective
means by which to achieve information gathering regarding potentially dangerous products due to the fact that “over 90 percent of
[tort law] suits are settled out of court.”172 There is an undeniable
threat to information gathering in the products liability arena given
the “pressure from individuals and their lawyers [to receive] compensation.”173 The desire for individuals to receive compensation
may lead to most cases being settled, which can impede information
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gathering processes necessary to improve product safety.174 Such a
threat, however, may be neutralized by having states bring lawsuits
on behalf of victims.175
State-initiated litigation occurred in the context of traditional
cigarettes in which numerous states’ attorneys general initiated lawsuits against some of the largest cigarette manufacturers in the industry.176 This series of litigation revealed significant information
about the tobacco industry by focusing “media and public attention
on the plaintiffs’ cigarette-induced suffering, as well as exciting
widespread discussion and debate on the larger issues of personal
and corporate responsibility.”177 Furthermore, the litigation also revealed substantial information through compelled disclosures, including “evidence of nicotine research within the industry,” which
assisted attorneys in developing legal arguments that the tobacco
companies conspired to “hide scientific evidence about the [known]
dangers of smoking . . . .”178 In sum, tobacco litigation proved to be
a significant instrument for advancing public health as it exposed
damaging information about the tobacco industry and laid the foundation for subsequent governmental regulations.179
When trial court activities are covered by the media, as was the
case with traditional cigarettes, this “may have similar effects to Supreme Court actions in increasing public awareness and legitimacy
of [the] issues before them.”180 Therefore, if we believe that tort litigation is a capable vehicle for both generating and integrating expert knowledge in order to expose dangerous products without FDA
intervention, then there seems to be no justifiable reason for the federal government to try and force-fit e-cigarette and vaporizer products into FDA regulatory processes like the Deeming Rule, which
was not designed for them. This contention is further supported by
174
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the FDA’s own statements noted above, in which the agency has
unambiguously conceded that it is not exactly sure how to quantify
the direct benefits of imposing the Deeming Rule on e-cigarettes and
vaporizer products.181
At present, current FDA regulatory measures are ineffectively
utilized. As discussed, the requirements for PMTA approval impose
significant costs on many industry manufacturers who simply do not
have the resources to meet those requirements.182 As a result, such
high costs will likely force many, especially smaller companies, out
of the industry.183 Further, for the select minority of companies that
can meet the PMTA burdens, the imposition of these newly imposed
costs will likely result in increased product pricing to fall on the
shoulders of consumers, and thus potentially disincentivize them
from purchasing a less dangerous, but more expensive tobacco alternative.184 Lastly, the excessive requirements to receive PMTA approval also pose a serious threat to the “stifling [of] innovation” by
disincentivizing investment in new technologies.185 As such, there
is a pressing need for a regulatory regime that strikes an appropriate
middle ground between protecting the public health interest without
imposing significant constraints on industry growth, product innovation, and consumer access to alternative harm reducing e-cigarette
devices.
In order to accomplish this goal, e-cigarettes and vaporizers
must not be subject to regulation in the same fashion as traditional
cigarettes. There are two compelling reasons for this. First, traditional cigarettes are scientifically proven to be lethal killers whereas
the harmful effects of e-cigarette and vaporizers remain largely inconclusive.186 What is conclusive, however, is that e-cigarettes and
vaporizers possess potential promise as a healthier alternative to
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traditional cigarettes.187 Thus, until there is conclusive science indicating that e-cigarettes and vaporizer products cause a substantial
threat to public health, the current FDA regulatory framework lacks
a rational basis and may, in the final analysis, “do more harm than
good” in regards to protecting public health.188 To be clear, this Note
does not argue that the federal government should refrain from imposing any regulatory measures; rather, there needs to be an appropriate balance between state and federal regulatory means because
solely utilizing rigid federal regulatory measures does not allow for
adjustment to be built in as the facts change. That said, under tort
law, adjustment can happen automatically as the facts change and
suddenly the litigation looks different. As such, tort law may provide
a flexible framework for regulation that can be utilized in conjunction with specific federal regulatory requirements.
One middle-ground position for a regulatory regime that incorporates both state tort law and federal regulatory measures may be
that the federal government first imposes serious restrictions on
marketing tactics aimed at the youth by, among other things, banning the sale of flavored e-cigarettes as President Donald Trump and
other officials have sought to do.189 The available data clearly reflects a heightened correlation between commercial sales of flavored
e-cigarettes and increased use by minors as recent studies indicate
that “[y]outh e-cigarette users cite flavors as a top reason they began
using e-cigarettes.”190 Second, in light of the recent outbreaks of
EVALI,191 which have revealed the THC thickening agent, vitamin
E acetate, to likely be the primary culprit attributable to the mysterious vape-related lung diseases, the federal government should also
impose a complete ban on the use of this thickening agent in all vaporizer products.192 Third, the FDA should implement restrictions
on the voltage or temperature settings at which e-cigarette and vaporizer devices can heat their liquids, given evidence indicating that
187
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sufficiently high temperatures may cause users to be exposed to increased levels of formaldehyde, but lower temperatures and voltages
produce no exposure.193 By restricting the sale of flavored e-cigarettes, prohibiting the use of vitamin e-acetate, and restricting device
voltages, the FDA will retain its regulatory measures designed to
protect the public health while eliminating most unintended adverse
impacts of the current regulatory scheme. These FDA regulatory
measures are appropriate because they address concrete and currently identifiable threats to public health.
Furthermore, to promote effective information gathering processes, the FDA should also implement an incentive system for
manufacturers in order to increase the volume and quality of information provided to the agency.194 Such an incentive system can be
utilized to address the current burdens of the PMTA approval process. Instead of requiring that all e-cigarette and vaporizer manufacturers be subjected to the financial burdens of the PMTA approval
process, the FDA should consider making PMTA requirements optional, but provide meaningful incentives for companies that do fulfill the PMTA requirements. In order to properly incentivize those
companies that meet the PMTA requirements, the FDA could develop a rule of construction that would impose a defense or bar
against products liability suits brought against those companies.195
Thus, if a company’s PMTA receives FDA approval, then the company would be insulated from tort liability.196 If a company, however, decides not to apply for or does not receive PMTA approval
for their product, then that company would not be provided insulation from tort liability suits based on defective design or inadequate
warnings or labels.197 Under this regulatory scheme, there will likely
be consolidation of the industry given that there will inevitably be
manufacturers that decide not to take advantage of the FDA incentives given a lack of resources, time, or otherwise, and thus will become exposed to lawsuits. That said, companies will have a strong
incentive to comply with the PMTA requirements given that
193
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damages incurred as a result of product liability suits have historically forced manufacturers into bankruptcy.198 Aside from these regulatory measures, however, the federal government should permit
state tort law to manage the remaining though uncertain risks associated with e-cigarette and vaporizer products.
To effectuate the functions of social deterrence and punishment,
product liability suits involving e-cigarette and vaporizer products
should be brought by the states themselves on behalf of victims instead of by private individuals.199 This type of public law regime
would presumably decrease the number of cases that settle out of
court, and thus increase the effectiveness of information gathering
through litigation, which integrates the use of expert knowledge.
Furthermore, such a regime may also protect private individuals
against a “scorched earth” litigation strategy, whereby large companies utilize their immense resources to delay litigation proceedings
and refuse to engage in settlement negotiations in an effort to
“wear[] down plaintiffs financially and emotionally.”200 Such a public law regime, however, could raise the issue of whether states can
be fully entrusted with the responsibility of initiating lawsuits
against industries when such action is appropriate.201 One mitigating
factor on this issue may be that providing states with this right of
action would allow for an entity to exercise a middle position judgment because while the states may have some political accountability, they also have real interests in money in addition to the beneficiaries who will vote for them.202 That said, such a regime may also
delay the time in which victims eventually receive compensation because the cases may not settle quickly, if at all. Nevertheless, the
increase in information gathering through state-initiated litigation
may outweigh this concern.203
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CONCLUSION
Products such as e-cigarette and vaporizers present uncertain
health risks yet to be fully understood.204 At the same time, these
products also possess potentially significant public health benefits
capable of improving societal health.205 Thus, in some ways, these
products can be thought of as valuable moving targets that are in
need of more factual learning. As a result, these products and future
ones like them require a flexible regulatory framework that is capable of building in adjustment as the facts develop. Striking a middle
ground between minimizing uncertain public health risks, while at
the same time not discouraging innovation and industry growth,
should be the primary goal for regulation. Thus, for officials tasked
with developing the most effective methods of regulation, perhaps
this means that they should take calculated risks in the interest of
promoting innovation as “[i]t is no accident that the most promising
technological [tobacco] alternative [originally] emerged from an unregulated environment.”206
The safety of our society is improved by the development of potentially “dangerous technologies.”207 Rather than imposing inequitable and overly burdensome regulatory regimes that discourage innovation and the diffusion of what may be the next significant public
health benefit, the most effective means of regulation might be to
embrace calculated risks in the pursuit of innovative technologies
that advance society. In the final analysis, a products liability theory
of regulation managed under state tort law that includes specific target-oriented federal restrictions may provide the most balanced regulatory framework for creating a habitable environment in which
new innovations for public health can appropriately flourish.
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